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The Mueller Report: More Questions Than Answers 
A Recipe for Foreign Interference in the 2020 Presidential Election? 
 
Abstract: 
This paper considers three major points of the Mueller Report, namely: Was the entire 
matter of Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election a “hoax”? Did the Trump 
Campaign conspire with, coordinate with, or collude with Russia? And, did the President 
obstruct justice? The paper also includes our conclusions and commentary relating to 
Special Counsel Mueller’s decision-making and choices, many of which we argue were 
flawed, leaving more questions than answers for the American people. 
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1. Introduction 
On May 17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, who was then serving 
as Acting Attorney General for the Russian investigation following the voluntary recusal 
of Attorney General Jeff Sessions, appointed Robert Mueller, former Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as Special Counsel to "investigate Russian 
interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters" (Green, 2019). 
Kotkin (2019, p. 62) described Mueller as follows: “He graduated in 1966 and soon 
thereafter volunteered for and was accepted into the Marine Corps. He won a Bronze Star 
for heroism in the Vietnam War and later attended law school at the University of 
Virginia. He has since spent nearly a half century in either private legal practice or law 
enforcement, including 12 years as director of the FBI.” 
His description of Donald Trump was far less flattering, stating that ”Trump had 
“dogged the Viet Nam War, reportedly by asking a podiatrist to dishonestly attest to the 
presence of bone spurs in Trump’s heel…. He tried his hand at running an airline and a 
get-rich-quick university before finally finding his true calling: playing a fantasy version 
of himself on a reality television show.”       
The mandate of the Special Counsel included investigating: 
"(i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and 
individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and 
(ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and 
(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. Section 600.4(a)." 
[28 C.F.R. Section 600.4(a) authorizes the Special Counsel to investigate and 
prosecute “federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to 
interfere with, the Special Counsel’s investigation, such as perjury, 
obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of 
witnesses.”] 
  Special Counsel issued his report on March 27, 2019. It appears that there are three 
main points of contention relating to the Mueller Report. Was the entire matter of Russian 
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interference a hoax, as maintained by the President? Did the Trump Campaign conspire 
with, coordinate with, or collude with Russia? Did the President obstruct justice? Part I 
of the paper deals with the first two questions; Part II will deal with the third. 
It is very important that readers understand the issues clearly, the President’s 
responses and actions, and the underlying legal principles that guided the determination 
by the Special Counsel whether President Trump was guilty of any crime in connection 
with the 2016 Presidential election and its aftermath. 
Throughout this paper, we will refer to the Report issued by the Special Counsel, 
Robert Mueller, as the Mueller Report or simply as “The Report.” The Office of the Special 
Counsel will be referred to either as “The Special Counsel” or “The Office.” In addition, 
this paper relies primarily on the verbatim text of the Mueller Report (unless otherwise 
noted) for accuracy and objectivity, adding case and legal analysis where needed. Only 
in the conclusion do we offer our commentary relating to Special Counsel Mueller’s 
decision-maklng process or choices, many of which we would argue were flawed, leaving 
more questions than answers for the American people.     
   
Part I – Russian Interference or Hoax? 
 
2. The Hoax Argument 
From the outset, President Trump has maintained that the "Russian thing was a 
hoax"—made up by his opponents to discredit him and call into question his 2016 
electoral victory. The Mueller Report, however, began with the following direct 
statement: "The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and 
systematic fashion" (italics added).  
The Report identified that Russia interfered in the 2016 Presidential election 
principally through two operations. First, a Russian entity carried out a social media 
campaign that favored Presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged 
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.  
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Denton (2019, p. 184) reported: 
“Agency hackers first created fake Facebook profiles under seemingly 
American names and identities. Next, Agency hackers used these profiles 
to purchase advertisements from Facebook, and designed inflammatory 
advertisements directed at hot-button political issues and the candidates 
themselves. Finally, using Facebook’s Core Audience and Custom 
Audience tools exactly as they are supposed to be used. Agency hackers 
directed these advertisements to target susceptible American voters by 
implementing specific demographic information into Facebook’s 
advertising tools. Algorithms by Facebook then used this demographic 
information to distribute the advertisements to the Agency’s target 
audience.” 
Second, “a Russian intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations 
[hacking] against entities, employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton campaign 
and then released stolen documents." to Secretary Clinton’s disadvantage.  
 
3. A Short Summary 
Part I of the Report dealing with Russian interference may be briefly summarized as 
follows: 
1. The Office of the Special Counsel determined that Russia's actions violated U.S. 
criminal law. Sixteen individuals and entities were charged with participating in 
a "conspiracy to defraud the United States by undermining through deceptive acts 
the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. 
elections, as well as related counts of identity theft" (see United States v. Internet 
Research Agency, 2018). In addition, in United States v. Netysksho (2018), twelve 
individuals were charged with conspiracy to violate, among other federal laws, 
the statute dealing with federal computer-intrusion (18 U.S.C. Section 2510). 
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2. While the investigation by the Special Counsel identified numerous "links" 
between individuals with ties to the Russian government and individuals 
associated with the Trump campaign, described in detail below, the evidence was 
judged to be insufficient to support the filing of criminal charges. Specifically, the 
Special Counsel concluded that the evidence was not sufficient "to charge any 
Campaign official as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other 
Russian principal." The Special Counsel also determined that evidence relating to 
the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower, attended by Donald Trump, Jr. 
(hereinafter Trump Jr.) , Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort, and the later Wikileaks 
releases of hacked materials was not sufficient to charge a specific campaign-
finance violation. Finally, the Special Counsel found that "the evidence was not 
sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump campaign conspired with 
representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election." 
3. The investigation did determine that severe individuals affiliated with the Trump 
campaign had lied to the Office of the Special Counsel and to the Congress about 
their "interactions with Russian-affiliated individuals and related matters" and 
that these falsehoods had "materially impaired the investigation of Russian 
interference." 
Specifically, former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to 
lying about interactions with Russian Ambassador Kisylak during the transition 
period. George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign, 
pleaded guilty to lying to investigators relating to interactions with Joseph 
Migsud, a London-based Professor, who had told Papadopoulos that he had "dirt" 
on candidate Clinton contained in thousands of captured emails. Michael Cohen, 
Trump Organization attorney, and long time associate of President Trump, 
pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower 
Moscow project. And, in February 2019, the Federal District Court for the District 
of Columbia found that Republican Convention Chair Paul Manafort had lied to 
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the Office of Special Counsel and to the grand jury relating to his personal 
interactions and communications with Konstantin Kilimnik, a Russian army 
veteran and manager of Manafort's consulting business in Ukraine, about sharing 
Trump campaign polling data and a possible peace plan for Ukraine.      
3.1 Actions of the Russian Government 
The Report found that the Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried on a social 
media campaign that was designed to "provoke and amplify political and social discord 
in the United States" (see generally Kovarik & Jackson, 2019). The IRA is an organization 
based in St. Petersburg, Russia, that received funding from a Russian oligarch, Yevgeniy 
Prighozin, widely reported as having close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The 
IRA employed social media accounts, engaged in "information warfare," posed as various 
pro-Trump "grassroots entities," purchased political advertisements, and staged political 
rallies inside the United States. They created fictitious support groups (Denton, 2019)—
one of the most prominent was "Miners for Trump"—and organized media 
events touting the Trump candidacy.   
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Second, “a Russian intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion [hacking] 
operations against entities, employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton campaign 
and then released stolen documents." Activities were undertaken by the Main 
Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Army or GRU (Gioe, Goodman, & Frey, 2019). 
These activities commenced as early as March of 2016, when the GRU began hacking the 
email accounts of former Secretary Clinton, and the computer of John Podesta, Clinton's 
campaign manager. In April, the GRU hacked into the computer network of the 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC). Around mid-June, the GRU began disseminating stolen materials 
through two fictitious online personas—DCLeaks and Gucifer 2.0. Later, the GRU released 
additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks. 
Wikileaks first release of emails came in July 2016. At the same time, candidate 
Donald Trump announced that he hoped that Russia would recover emails that 
were described as "missing" from a private email server maintained by Mrs. Clinton 
when she was serving as Secretary of State. Said candidate Trump: "Russia, if you're 
listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will 
probably be rewarded mightily by our press.” Trump later said he was not serious and 
was speaking “sarcastically.” Wikileaks began the release of Podesta's stolen emails on 
October 7, 2016, less than one hour after the media had released video [The Billy Bush 
interview] that could have been very damaging—and perhaps fatal—to the Trump 
campaign.          
Contrary to the assertion that the statement relating to Russia was made  
sarcastically, the Special Counsel outlined numerous contacts from the Trump campaign 
relating to Wikileaks, including comments made by former campaign chairman Rick 
Gates, Michael Cohen, Convention Manager Paul Manafort, and actions undertaken by 
“a technical campaign outsider” Jerome Corsi, a noted conspiracy theorist and anti-
Barack Obama “birther.” 
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4. Collusion: Prosecution or Declination? That Is the Question. 
The Report outlined the nature and extent of Russian contacts with the Trump 
campaign, including:  
2015: Some of the earliest interactions were made in connection with 
the Trump Organization's real estate project in Russia known as "Trump 
Tower Moscow." The Trump Organization in fact continued to pursue 
the project through at least June 2016—although candidate Trump falsely 
stated on numerous occasions that he had "no business interests with 
Russia." 
Spring 2016: George Papadopoulos, who served as a foreign policy adviser 
to the campaign, made an early contact with Joseph Misfud, a "London-
based professor who had connections to Russia," who informed 
Papadopoulos that the Russian government had "dirt" on Hillary Clinton 
in the form of thousands of stolen emails. Both Papadopoulos and Manafort 
tried unsuccessfully to arrange for a meeting between the Russian 
government and the campaign. 
Summer 2016: On June 8, 2016, a Russian lawyer met with Donald Trump, 
Jr. (hereinafter Trump Jr.), Jared Kushner (Trump's son-in-law and husband 
of Ivanka Trump), and Paul Manafort at the Trump Tower in New York 
City (The Trump Tower Meeting) in order to ostensibly deliver what had been 
described as "official documents and information that would incriminate 
Hillary." Mueller wrote that the materials were offered to Trump Jr. as "part 
of Russia and its government's support of Mr. Trump" and the campaign 
anticipated receiving the information at the Trump Tower meeting. In fact, 
the meeting produced no such information, despite expectations to the 
contrary. 
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Fall 2016: October 7 saw the release of a video of Donald Trump talking 
about women in graphic and disparaging terms. As was noted earlier, less 
than one hour later, Wikileaks made a second release of thousands of 
emails that the GRU had stolen in late March. 
As the investigation determined, it should be noted that contrary to 
statements later made by President Trump that the Obama administration 
had done virtually nothing with regard to these developments, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence issued a joint statement to the public that "the Russian 
Government directed the recent compromise of e-mails from US persons 
and institutions including from US political organizations" and that these 
"thefts" and "disclosures"  were "intended to interfere with the US election 
process."   
Post-Election: Immediately after the 2016 election victory of Donald 
Trump, "Russian government officials and prominent Russian businessmen 
began trying to make inroads into the new administration." These included 
attempts by Kirill Dmitriev, chief executive officer of Russia's sovereign 
wealth fund, to make contact with senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon 
and introductions to friends of Jared Kushner.  
On December 29, President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for its 
interference in the election. Incoming Trump administration National 
Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian Ambassador Sergey 
Kislyak and "asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the 
sanctions." On December 30, President Putin announced that Russia would 
not take retaliatory measures. This announcement was met by a Trump 
tweet: "Great move on delay..."  
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2017 (Pre-Inauguration): On January 6, 2017, President-elect Trump 
received a joint assessment by the CIA, the FBI, and the National Security 
Agency that concluded "with great confidence" that Russia had indeed 
interfered in the 2016 election through a variety of means to assist the 
Trump candidacy and to harm the candidacy of Secretary Clinton.      
Why, then, did Mueller not find collusion between Russia and the Trump 
campaign? 
 
4.1 The Trump Tower Meeting: Crossing the Rubicon or Innocent Encounter? 
The Special Counsel had to make a series of critical decisions whether to charge 
individuals or entities with a federal crime. Perhaps the most important public focus has 
been the June 9 Trump Tower meeting in New York City. The Office would evaluate 
“whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a federal 
offense [“implicating the federal election law ban on contributions and donations by 
foreign nationals”] and whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to 
obtain a conviction for such an offense.”  
At the outset, the Office made it clear that it had evaluated potential criminal 
conduct not under the "rubric of "collusion,” 'but through the lens of conspiracy law." The 
Report noted that "collusion is not a specific offense or theory of liability found in the 
United States Code, nor is it a term of art in federal penal law." (Berke, James, & 
Bookbinder, 2018).  
 
4.2 What Exactly is a Campaign Violation Relating to a Foreign National? 
Did the June 9, 2016 meeting at the Trump Tower constitute prosecutable 
violations of campaign finance laws?  
Campaign or federal election law in the United States (Bauer & Kafka, 1983; 
Gardner & Guy-Uriel, 2017) broadly prohibits foreign nationals from “making 
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contributions, donations, expenditures, or other disbursements in connection with 
federal, state, or local elections,” and prohibits anyone from “soliciting, accepting, or 
receiving such contributions or donations… expressly advocating the election or defeat 
of a clearly identified candidate made independently of a campaign.” Campaign law also 
forbids disbursement for an “electioneering communication” or broadcast 
communication that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office.” The term 
“contribution” includes “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or 
anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for 
Federal office (52 U.S.C. Section 30101(8)(A)(i)).  
However, the statute specifically excludes news stories and non-partisan “get-out-
the-vote” activities. The definition of “foreign nations” includes foreign governments and 
political parties, individuals outside of the U.S. who are not legal permanent residents, 
and certain non-U.S. entities located outside of the United States. 
A “knowing and willful” violation involving an “aggregate” of $25,000 or more in 
a calendar year is a felony (United States v. Danielczyk, 2013).  
 
4.3 What Exactly was the Evidence Relating to the June 9 Meeting? 
  On June 3, 2016 Robert Goldstone, “a British publicist, music manager, and former 
tabloid journalist,” had e  mailed Donald Trump Jr. to pass along an “offer” from Russia’s 
Crown Prosecutor to the Trump Campaign of “official documents and information that 
would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to 
[Trump Jr.’s] father”; 
• Trump Jr. responded: “If it’s what you say I love especially later in 
the summer”; 
• Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov (a Russian pop star and real estate 
developer) had a series of follow-up discussions and within days, 
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scheduled the now famous meeting attended by Trump Jr., 
Manafort, and Kushner. 
 
4.4 What did the Special Counsel Conclude? Applying the Law to the Facts. 
Interestingly, the Special Counsel conceded that there were authorities that 
supported the view that “candidate related opposition research given to a campaign for 
the purpose of influencing an election could constitute a contribution to which a foreign-
source ban could apply.” The rationale for such a position is quite direct: “A foreign entity 
that engaged in such research and provided resulting information to a campaign could 
exert a greater effect on an election, and a greater tendency to ingratiate the donor to the 
candidate, than a gift of money or tangible things of value.” However, the Special 
Counsel noted that “no judicial decision has treated the voluntary provision of 
uncompensated opposition research or similar information as a thing of value that could 
amount to a contribution under campaign finance law.” Additionally, the Special 
Counsel recognized unique Constitutional questions relating to gathering of traditional 
“opposition research” (Serazio, 2018) that might be protected by the First Amendment. 
What did the evidence adduce regarding the extent of criminal liability, if any, on 
the part of individuals associated wit the Trump Campaign? The investigation uncovered 
“extensive evidence” that Paul Manafort and Richard Gates, the deputy campaign 
manager, had engaged in pre-campaign work for the government of Ukraine that 
violated the Foreign Agent Registration Act or FARA (18 U.S.C. Section 951(d)) (Wright, 
2018). 
The WillmerHale law firm (2019) notes that the “FARA requires “agents” of 
“foreign principals” to register with DOJ and to file periodic reports regarding their work, 
unless their activities fit within one of FARA’s important statutory and regulatory 
exemptions.” They note that FARA “broadly defines “foreign principal” to encompass 
not only foreign governments, officials, and political parties, but also foreign individuals 
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and business enterprises—specifically, any “partnership, association, corporation, 
organization, or other combination of persons organized under the laws or having its 
principal place of business in a foreign country” (22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(3)).  
FARA also defines the term “agent of a foreign principal” to “encompass those 
who engage in a range of activities directed at influencing U.S. policy or public opinion 
on behalf of foreign clients, as well as those who otherwise seek to advance foreign 
political interests in the United States. Specifically, the term applies to any person who 
acts “at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal or of a 
person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, 
financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal.”  
  A criminal act is completed when “knowingly acting in the United States as an 
unregistered foreign-government agent.” Unlike other criminal statutes, FARA does not 
require “willfulness, and “knowledge of the notification requirement is not an element of 
the offense” (see United States v. Campo, 2008; United States v. Duran, 2010). 
The statute outlines four separate triggering activities by an agent who: 
1. Engages in “political activities for or in the interests of [the] foreign 
principal” which includes attempts to influence federal officials or the 
public; 
2. Acts as “public relations counsel publicity agent, information-service 
employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign 
principal”; 
3. “Solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or 
other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal”; or 
4. “Represents the interests of such foreign principal before any federal 
agency or official.” 
Both Manafort and Gates were charged with and eventually admitted to violations 
of the FARA when they both pleaded guilty in prosecutions in the District of Columbia 
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(United States v. Richard W. Gates III (Plea Agreement), 2018; United States v. Paul J. 
Manafort, Jr. (Plea Agreement), 2018). In addition, the investigation had adduced 
evidence of FARA violations by Michael Flynn in connection with Turkey, but not with 
Russia (United States v. Michael Flynn, 2017).  
However, the Special Counsel stated that the investigation did not “yield evidence 
sufficient to sustain any charge that any individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign 
acted as an agent of a foreign principal within the meaning of FARA, or … subject to the 
direction or control of the government of Russia, or any official thereof.” In particular, 
the Office did not find evidence likely to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that campaign 
officials such as Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos, and Carter Page [National 
Security adviser to the Trump Campaign] had “acted as agents of the Russian 
government— or at its direction, control, or request— during the relevant time period.”  
The Special Counsel conceded that the communications arranging for the meeting 
and the attendance by “high-level” Campaign representatives supported an inference 
that the Campaign had anticipated receiving derogatory documents and information 
from official Russian sources that could assist Trump’s electoral prospects; and that 
documentary evidence in the form of email chains supports the inference that Kushner 
and Manafort were aware of the purpose and attended the June 9 meeting in anticipation 
of the receipt of helpful information to the Campaign from Russian sources.  
However, the Office did not establish that any of the contacts amounted to an 
agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal criminal law "to interfere with 
or obstruct a lawful function of a government agency during the campaign or transition 
period." As to this issue of defrauding under Section 371 of the United States Code, the 
Office noted that this section "criminalizes participating in an agreement to obstruct a 
lawful function of the U.S. government or its agencies through deceitful or dishonest 
means" (see Hammerschmidt v. United States, 1924; United States v. Concord Management and 
Consulting LLC, 2018). The investigation also did not identify evidence that "any 
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Campaign official or associate knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy 
to defraud.” 
 
4.5.1 Procedural Issues 
The Office determined that it had not obtained admissible evidence “likely to 
sustain a conviction” for two reasons: 
First, the Office concluded that the evidence it had received was unlikely to 
meet the government’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner had acted “willfully,” with “general 
knowledge of the illegality of their conduct”; and 
Second, the government would likely “encounter difficulty in proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the promised information 
exceeded the threshold for a criminal violation.” 
The Special Counsel had raised a scienter requirement; that is, could it obtain 
admissible evidence that the defendant had “general knowledge” that his or her conduct 
was unlawful beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, the Special Counsel raised the analytical 
stakes: “This standard creates an elevated scienter element requiring at the very least, 
that application of the law to the facts in question be fairly clear. When there is substantial 
doubt concerning whether the law applies to the facts of a particular matter, the offender 
is more likely to have an intent defense” (Election Offenses, p. 123). 
In fact, the Special Counsel was quite explicit: 
“Although members of the IRA had contact with individuals affiliated with 
the Trump Campaign, the indictment did not charge any Trump Campaign 
officials or any other U.S. person with participating in the conspiracy. That 
is because the investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. person 
who coordinated or communicated with the IRA knew that he or she was 
speaking with Russian nationals engaged in the criminal conspiracy. The 
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Office therefore determined that such persons did not have the knowing or 
criminal purpose required to charge them ninth conspiracy to defraud the 
United states or in the separate count alleging a wire (Lanuiti, 2019) and 
bank-fraud conspiracy (Nichols, 2019) involving the IRA and two Russian 
nationals” (italics added). 
Thus, in applying the “knowing and willful” standard, the Special Counsel 
concluded that “in light of the government’s substantial burden of proof on issues of 
intent, and the difficulty of establishing the value of the offered information, criminal 
charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that “the admissible evidence will 
not probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction’ (Justice Manual Section 9-
27.220). 
To this point, the Special Counsel stated that the government would unlikely be 
able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Trump Jr., Manafort, or Kushner had “general 
knowledge” that their conduct was unlawful or that they were “familiar with the foreign 
contribution band.” 
Finally, the Special Counsel stated that it would be difficult to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the value of the promised documents and other information 
exceeded either the $2,000 threshold for the commission of a misdemeanor or the $25,000 
for a felony. The descriptions of the evidence offered by Goldstone were “quite general” 
and lacked the specificity under applicable law. Accordingly, “taking into account the 
high burden to establish a culpable mental state in a campaign-finance prosecution and 
the difficulty in establishing the requisite valuation, the Office decided not to pursue 
criminal campaign-finance charges against Trump Jr. or other campaign officials for the 
events of the June 9 meeting.” 
Although the Special Counsel declined to bring charges against individuals in the 
Trump Campaign, it sought charges against two sets of Russian nationals “for their roles 
in perpetrating the active measures social-media campaign and computer-intrusion 
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operation.” Charges against various individuals included violating U.S. criminal laws in 
order to interfere with U.S. elections and political processes; conspiracy to defraud the 
United States; conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud; and aggravated identity 
theft (e.g., Solove & Citron, 2018). At the same time, the Office concluded that it would 
bring charges against certain individuals (Flynn, Papadopoulos, Cohen, and Manafort) 
with “making fall statements or otherwise obstructing the investigation or parallel 
congressional investigations.” 
In sum, the Special Prosecutor found that considering the considerable burden 
attendant to proof of intent ("knowing" and "willful") and the difficulty of establishing 
the "value" of the available information, criminal charges would not be brought. The 
Independent Counsel noted that filing of criminal charges would not meet the Justice 
Department's standard that "the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain 
and sustain a conviction" (Justice Manual Section 9-27.220).  
However, it is important to note that the Report did not state "there was no 
evidence" (e.g., Smith, 2019). To the contrary, there was “evidence,” but the Report stated 
that "the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any member of Trump campaign conspired 
with representatives of the Russian government to interfere with the 2016 election" (italics 
added).   
   
Part II 
 
5. Obstruction of Justice: Limitations on Action 
The order appointing the Special Counsel gave the Special Counsel jurisdiction to 
investigate whether President Trump had obstructed justice in connection with the 
investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election and other related matters, 
including the investigation itself. 
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The Special Counsel began the discussion of this issue by describing the 
considerations that guided the obstruction-of-justice investigation (Lavin, Bell, Dunker, 
& McBride, 2019). Only by understanding these considerations—actually limitations—
will it be possible to appreciate the conclusion reached by the Special Counsel not to 
charge the President with obstruction. 
First, because the President of the United States ostensibly was the object of their 
inquiry, the Special Counsel determined that it would not make a “traditional 
prosecutorial judgment.” History and practice weighed heavily on this determination 
(Hansen, 2019). In 2000, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) had issued an opinion found 
in “A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution” (Moss, 24 
Op. O.L.C., 2000,  pp. 251-52 (OLC Opinion)) in which it found that “the indictment or 
criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the 
executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions” in violation of “the 
constitutional separation of powers” (Kriner & Schickler, 2018). The Special Counsel, as an 
attorney in the Department of Justice, and in recognition of statutory authority (28 U.S.C. 
Section 155), accepted the  OLC’s conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorial 
jurisdiction, essentially determining that the President was protected by an overarching 
principle of immunity. In addition, the Special Counsel stated that apart from this 
constitutional consideration, a “prosecutorial accusation against a sitting President 
would place burdens on the President’s capacity to govern and potentially preempt 
constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct”— implicitly 
recognizing the implications of Article 1, Section 3 of the United States Constitution 
relating to impeachment. 
Second, while the OLC had concluded that a sitting President may not be 
prosecuted, the OLC opinion (Moss, 2000) nonetheless recognized that “a criminal 
investigation during the President’s term is permissible.” In fact, the OLC stated directly that 
“A grand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period of immunity” 
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(OLC Opinion, 2000, p. 257). The OLC opinion, however, recognized that “a President 
does not have immunity after he leaves office… . And if individuals other than the 
President committed an obstruction offense, they may be prosecuted at this time.”  
Third, since the Special Counsel concluded that no charge could constitutionally 
be leveled against a sitting President, it determined that it would not adopt “an approach 
that could potentially result in a judgment that the President committed crimes.” The 
Special Counsel stated that “Fairness concerns counseled against potentially reaching 
that judgment [whether or not a person’s conduct “constitutes a federal offense] when no 
charges can be brought.” As a matter of policy: 
“The ordinary means for an individual to respond to an accusation is 
through a speedy and public trial, with all the procedural protections that 
surround a criminal case. An individual who believes he was wrongly 
accused can use that process to seek to clear his name. In contrast, a 
prosecutor’s judgment that crimes were committed, but that no charges will 
be brought, affords no such adversarial opportunity for public name-
clearing before an impartial adjudicator.” 
This consideration has also been raised against the practice of naming unindicted 
co-conspirators in an indictment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
tracking the Justice Manual (Section 9-11.130), noted in United States v. Briggs (1975): “The 
courts have struck down with strong language efforts by grand juries to accuse persons 
of crimes while affording them no forum in which to vindicate themselves.” 
 
5.1 Did the President Nevertheless Obstruct Justice? 
The Special Counsel delineated in great detail the areas of the investigation that 
could involve a potential charge of obstruction of justice: 
 
1. The campaign’s response to reports about Russian support for Trump; 
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2. Conduct involving FBI Director James Comey, including the President’s 
termination of Director Comey; 
3. The President’s reaction to the continuing Russia investigation;  
4. The appointment of a Special Counsel and efforts to remove him; 
5. Efforts to curtail the Special Counsel’s investigation; 
6. Efforts to prevent public disclosure of evidence;  
7. Further efforts to have Attorney General Sessions take control of the investigation 
after his initial recusal; 
8. Efforts to have Don McGahn, White House Attorney, deny that the President had 
ordered him to have the Special Counsel removed; 
9. Conduct toward Flynn, Manafort, and an “unnamed” individual; 
10. Conduct involving Michael Cohen. 
In deciding whether a particular act might rise to the level of obstruction of justice, 
three elements are common: (1) an obstructive act which “reaches all corrupt conduct 
capable of producing an effect that prevents justice from being administered, regardless 
of the means employed” (United States v. Silverman, 1984); (2) a nexus (connection) 
between the obstructive act and an official proceeding, where the individual has 
“knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceedings” (United States v. 
Aguilar, 1995, p. 599); and, (3) a corrupt intent.   
Acting “knowingly” requires proof that the individual was “conscious of 
wrongdoing” (Arthur Andersen v. United States, 2005, pp. 705-706).  The issue of “corrupt 
intent” requires some further amplification. 
 In United States v. Gordon (2013, p. 1151), the Tenth Judicial Circuit stated that “to 
act corruptly means to act with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly 
and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct the relevant 
proceedings.” For example, in consideration of any charge of witness tampering, the 
United States Code (Section 1512(b)(1)(3)) makes it a crime to “knowingly use 
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intimidation or corruptly persuade another person or engage in misleading conduct 
towards another person” with the intent to “influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of 
any person in an official proceeding” or to “hinder, delay, or prevent communication to 
a law enforcement officer… of information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense.” To establish corrupt persuasion, it is sufficient that a 
defendant had asked a potential witness to lie to investigators in contemplation of a likely 
federal investigation into his conduct (United States v. Edlind, 2018). Interestingly, corrupt 
persuasion may be found “where a defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if 
the story were true, intending that the witness believe the story and testify to it” (United 
States v. Rodolitz, 1986), or where a person, with an improper motive urges a witness not 
to cooperate with law enforcement (United States v. Shotts, 1998). 
 
5.2 What the Evidence Showed 
The Report indicated that after the appointment of the Special Counsel, the Office 
had obtained evidence relating to potential acts of obstruction of justice: 
 
…  “The President’s January 27, 2017 dinner with former FBI Director James 
Comey in which the President reportedly asked for Comey’s “loyalty,” one day after the 
White House had been briefed by the Department of Justice on contacts between former 
National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and the Russian Ambassador; 
…  The President’s February 14, 2017 meeting with Comey in which the President 
reportedly asked Comey not to pursue an investigation of Flynn; 
…  The President’s private requests to Comey to make public the fact that the 
President was not the subject of an FBI investigation in order to lift what the President 
regarded as a “cloud on his presidency”; 
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…  The President’s outreach to the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Directors of the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency about the 
FBI’s Russia investigation; 
…  The President’s stated rationales for terminating Comey on May 9, 2017, 
including statements that could reasonably be understood as acknowledging that the 
FBI’s Russia investigation was a factor in Comey’s termination; and 
…  The President’s statement about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower meeting 
between Russians and senior Trump Campaign officials that said that the meeting was 
about adoption and the Magnitsky Act (see Appendix I) (Contini & Shin, 2017) and 
omitted the fact that the Russians had offered to provide the Trump Campaign with 
derogatory information about Hillary Clinton. 
Taking into account the evidence it brought forth, and an analysis of both statutory 
and constitutional principles, the Special Counsel determined that there was a sufficient 
factual and legal basis to “further investigate potential obstruction of justice issues 
involving the President.” What did the Special Counsel do? It requested that the White 
House provide it with documentary evidence in its possession on relevant issues; it sought 
and obtained the White House’s concurrence in conducting interviews of White House 
personnel who were deemed to have relevant information; it interviewed witness who had 
“pertinent knowledge;” it obtained evidence on a voluntary basis “where possible;” and it 
used legal process where appropriate. 
The Special Counsel also sought a voluntary interview with the President. “After 
more than a year of discussion, the President declined to be interviewed.” The President 
agreed to answer written questions on “certain Russia-related topics.” To no one’s real 
surprise, his answers  included such responses as: “I have no recollection” (11 times); “I 
do not recall” (10 times); “I do not recall being aware” (2 times); “I have no independent 
recollection” (2 times); “I am not aware” (1 time); “I do not remember” (7 times); “I have 
become aware” (5 times); and “I have no current recollection” (1 time). 
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5.3 Why did the Special Counsel Not Insist on Interviewing the President?   
The Special Counsel made it clear that he had the “authority and legal justification 
to issue a grand jury subpoena to obtain the President’s testimony.” The decision not to 
subpoena the President was made, in part, because of the “substantial delay that such an 
investigative step would likely produce at a late stage in our investigation.” The Special 
Counsel also believed that they had “sufficient evidence to understand relevant events 
and to make certain assessments without the President’s testimony because of the 
“significant body of evidence we had already obtained of the President’s actions and his 
public and private statements….”     
 
5.4 Final Determination Relating to Obstruction of Justice 
It is certainly true that the evidence the Special Counsel had uncovered relating to 
the President’s actions and intent “presented difficult issues that would need to be 
resolved” if the President were indicted on obstruction charges. Because the Special 
Counsel had made the threshold determination not to consider the charges relating to 
obstruction of justice based on a “traditional prosecutorial judgment,” namely whether a 
prosecutor could secure a conviction on underlying charges based upon proof “beyond 
a reasonable doubt,” the Special Counsel refused to draw “ultimate conclusions” about 
the conduct of the President.  
However, it did not end its commentary there. The Special Counsel made what 
can only be an extraordinary statement, seemingly in conflict with its earlier cautionary 
representation:  
“At the same time, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of 
the facts that the President did not commit obstruction of justice, we would 
so state. Based on the facts and applicable legal standards, we are unable to 
reach that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the 
President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him” (italics added).   
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6. Commentary 
Having considered the determinations and arguments of the Special Counsel, we 
will now offer our own commentary. We consider several points in opposition to the 
conclusions of the Special Counsel: 
• The defense of “dumb and dumber and another” as to intent and knowledge on 
the part of Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner: 
Although the Special Counsel declined to find that the Trump Campaign had 
conspired with Russia, several questions still persist: When Trump Jr. was approached 
with possible "dirt" on Mrs. Clinton, instead of immediately rejecting the overture or 
reporting the contact to law enforcement (such as the FBI), Trump Jr. seemingly relished 
the idea. Instead of publicly disdaining Russian interference with the 2016 election,  
candidate Donald Trump invited, even sarcastically, their efforts. And, in the end, the 
Special Counsel found that the Trump campaign could not conspire with the Russians  
because individuals such as Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner were unaware that their 
actions would or might violate U.S. campaign law. Considering the experience of the 
participants—most especially Paul Manafort—is it reasonable to believe that at least one 
of these individuals would not have exhibited the requisite knowledge and intent to 
violate U.S. campaign law? Perhaps the best tactic for the Special Counsel would have 
been to seek an indictment and trial of the President and leave it up to a jury to decide 
questions of “knowledge” and “intent.” 
• Reliance on an “extra-constitutional” statement of the OLC: 
Mueller’s position was that he was bound by the memo of the OLC that a sitting 
President could not be charged criminally. Yet, there was no opinion from any court to 
that effect—just an internal Justice Department memo from nearly twenty years earlier 
which was designed to apply to a different set of facts and totally unrelated parties. 
• Refusal to subpoena the President based on an artificial “time line” that did not 
exist: 
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Mueller declined to pursue a subpoena for the President, citing some imaginary 
"time" issue. The Special Counsel had no mandated ending date for his work. In fact, the 
Office had consistently resisted all calls to set a “date certain” for wrapping-up its work. 
Yet, in considering this critical issue, the lateness of the date in the investigation loomed 
as a major point in Mueller’s failing to act to issue a subpoena for the President. 
• Reluctance to test the President’s refusal to sit for a deposition or answer question 
by issuing a subpoena or moving to hold the President in contempt of court for 
such failure: 
Deposing the president or insisting on the President offering written responses to 
questions on the issue of obstruction would have clarified issues relating to the 
President’s knowledge and intent. Yet, Mueller reused to seek a definitive answer on these 
issues.     
• Refusal to push back against the President’s “non responsive” responses:  
Considering the President had answered incompletely 39 times in his written 
responses should have triggered further action on the part of the Special Counsel to seek 
more definitive answers—not a retreat from efforts to compel the President to respond in 
a timely fashion. 
• Refusal to force the President to assert Fifth Amendment rights in the face of the 
possibility that the public would consider this action as an admission of guilt: 
If the President had been compelled to answer a grand jury subpoena, the 
President would have two choices: Agree to testify on the record and under oath and 
presumably tell the truth or assert his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination 
(O’Neill, 2002). Actually, there was a third choice: Continue to lie about these issues and 
risk indictment on that basis. The consequences of asserting his Fifth Amendment rights 
might have proved catastrophic for the President in a political context, but it would have 
been his decision to make—not the special counsel.  As Professor O’Neill (2002, p. 2551) 
noted: “It must be remembered that the Fifth Amendment was designed to protect people 
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from being convicted and punished by the state as a consequence of their own admission; 
it was not intended to save them from the penalties of being unpopular or scorned for 
their beliefs .” 
• Undertaking actions that might have possibly forced the president to fire the 
special counsel and risk the implications of a “Saturday Night massacre” (Blake, 
2018): 
If matters had deteriorated to the point of a legal stalemate with the Special 
Counsel, the President could have made the decision to fire the Special Counsel, a right 
he had asserted on many occasions. Whether or not this action would have triggered a 
public outcry as great as what had followed the “Saturday Night Massacre” during 
Watergate is a matter of pure speculation.  
But in each of these cases, it would have been the President—and not the Special 
Counsel—that made a decision. 
So, what we do have is evidence that that a President of the United States and his 
campaign at least colluded and may have illegally conspired with a foreign power with 
overtly hostile designs towards the United States in order to win an election. The 
evidence may not have risen to the point of a crime, but the evidence was there in any 
case. 
Secondly, it is apparent that the President obstructed justice—and  that had he not 
been the President, an indictment surely would have followed.  
In either case, the Mueller Report did provide many facts—and legal analysis—of 
what had transpired in the run-up to the 2016 Presidential Election and beyond, how the 
Trump campaign had willingly sought the assistance of Russia, and how the President 
had gone to the extreme to cover up that fact. 
In our view, Special Counsel Mueller left the American people with more 
questions than answers; more uncertainty than certainty; and with a great chance that 
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foreign interference could—or more likely will—occur in connection with the 2020 
election as well. 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
The Magnitsky Act, which was formally known as the “Russia and Moldova Jackson–Vanik 
Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012,” is a bipartisan bill 
passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President Barack Obama in December 
2012. The Act was intended to punish Russian officials responsible for the death of 
Russian tax accountant, Sergei Magnitsky, in a Moscow prison in 2009.  
The Act applies globally and since 2016, it authorizes the U.S. government to sanction 
those who it sees as human rights offenders, freezing their assets, and ban them from 
entering the U.S. (generally Ruys, 2018). 
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